@inproceedings{02277bb753864241832d0fd00b6e8c6d,
title = "A syntactic proof of Arrow's Theorem in a modal logic of social choice functions",
abstract = "We show how to formalise Arrow's Theorem on the impossibility of devising a method for preference aggregation that is both independent of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto efficient by using a modal logic of social choice functions. We also provide a syntactic proof of the theorem in that logic. While prior work has been successful in applying tools from logic and automated reasoning to social choice theory, this is the first human-readable formalisation of the Arrovian framework allowing for a direct derivation of the theorem.",
keywords = "Logic, Social choice theory",
author = "Giovanni Cin{\`a} and Ulle Endriss",
note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.; 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 ; Conference date: 04-05-2015 Through 08-05-2015",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",
publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",
pages = "1009--1017",
editor = "Edith Elkind and Gerhard Weiss and Pinar Yolum and Bordini, {Rafael H.}",
booktitle = "AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
}